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Abstract 
 
Signaling theory suggests that when high-quality entities signal their potentials such as intellectual 
capital to the market, its participants (e.g., investors) re-evaluate their worth and make informed decisions 
therefrom. This paper examines the consequences of intellectual capital disclosures with respect to firm value, 
information asymmetry, and cost of capital. Voluntary intellectual capital disclosure (ICD, measured in 
index) affects firm value (FV, measured in Tobin‟s Q) through reducing both information asymmetry (IA, 
measured in bid-ask spread) and cost of capital (COC, measured in weighted average cost of capital). 67 
Indonesian manufacturers were purposively selected whose financial reports published in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange official website and Bloomberg provide the data for the research. A research model is estimated to 
the data through a partial least square analysis. Results provides substantial evidence on the positive effect of 
ICD on FV and negative effect on IA; negative effect of IA on FV; negative effect of COC on FV; and 
positive effect of IA on COC. On a separate analysis, IA is shown to significantly mediate the relationship 
between ICD and FV. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There is a leapfrog increase in the market capita-
lization of global companies over the years. Price-
waterhouseCoopers (2017) reports that, between 2009 
and 2017 alone, the capital market consistently puts a 
higher value on shareholder equity (i.e., market value) 
than the value appearing on corporate balance sheet 
(i.e., the book value). The difference between market 
and book value is the portion of intangible assets often 
undisclosed under the traditional financial reporting 
(Brennan & Connell, 2000; Hulten & Hao, 2008; 
Iranmahd, Moeinaddin, Shahmoradi & Heyrani, 
2014; Rieg & Vanini, 2015; Ferchichi & Paturel, 
2013; Boujelbene & Affes, 2013; Anifowose, Abdra-
shud & Annuar, 2016; Dashti, Aleemi & Tariq, 2016; 
Brand Finance Institute, 2017). Indonesia is among 
many nations reported to have approximately half of 
its firms‟ intangible assets remain undisclosed (Brand 
Finance Institute, 2015). Given that intellectual capital 
determines a firm‟s future wealth creation, its 
[voluntary] disclosure in the annual report communi-
cate the firm‟s superior value to the capital market 
(Whiting & Miller, 2008; Haji & Anifowose, 2017). 
Previous studies have only partially investigated 
the consequences of intelectual capital disclosure 
(ICD hereafter). For instance, scholars examined the 
effect of ICD on firm value (FV hereafter) (e.g., 
Orens et al., 2009; Ferchihi & Paturel, 2013), infor-
mation asymmetry (IA hereafter) (Anifowose et al., 
2016; Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux & Magnan, 2009), and 
cost of capital (COC hereafter) (Boujelbene & Affes, 
2013; Anifowose et al., 2016). An integrated research 
framework comprising of these four focal issues have 
yet received a proper attention in the literature. 
Specifically, past studies have yet to examine the 
effect of ICD on FV with IA and COC as the key 
mediating processes. This study aims to close this gap 
by investigating the impact of firms‟ disclosure on 
their intangible information in reducing the informa-
tion asymmetry and lowering the cost of capital, 
resulting ultimately in an increased firm value. With 
respect to the era of knowledge-based economy, it 
provides a valuable insight into the importance of 
intangible assets to firm valuation, a topic of inves-
tigation lacking in studies in both the accounting and 
finance literature (Boujelbene & Affes, 2013). 
 
2. Literature Review  
Abeysekera and Guthrie (2002) define ICD as a 
disclosure made by an organization about its 
intellectual capital aimed to meet users‟ need for 
information not commonly found in the traditional 
reporting framework. Intellectual capital disclosure 
comprises of three major components namely human 
capital, structural capital and relational capital  
(Cabrita & Vaz, 2006; Benevene & Cortini, 2010; 
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Boujelbene & Affes, 2013). ICD is valuable to the 
extent that it affects investors‟ behaviors in their 
decision-making (Alfraih, 2017; Dashti et al., 2016; 
Williams, 2001; Anifowose et al., 2016; Salehi, 
Rostami & Hesari, 2014; Ferchichi & Paturel, 2013).  
Signaling theory proposes that when a firm 
signals its potentials to the market, investors will re-
evaluate and [hence] make a more favorable decision 
on its value (Whiting & Miller, 2008). The era of 
knowledge-based economy acknowledges firms‟ 
intellectual capital as the essential foundation for 
firms‟ future success (Williams, 2001), which is used 
to create and apply knowledge within the firms, 
thereby enhancing their value (Cabrita & Vaz, 2006). 
Extensively, intellectual capital disclosure forms a 
relative chunk of voluntary disclosures that places the 
firm in proper perspective for investors and other 
stakeholders (Asare, Onumah & Simpson, 2013). 
Thus, a major premise is that organizations disclose 
intellectual capital to improve transparency, legitimize 
status and enhance reputation (Oliveira, Rodrigues & 
Craig, 2006). The transparency leads to the increase 
of firm value since it appeals market to have a better 
image of an organization through the intellectual 
capital information released (Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000). In the financial market, intellectual capital is 
one of the most important information that explains 
the increasing firm value. When disclosed, it increases 
investors‟ and creditors‟ interests therefore their con-
fidence in investment decisions (Ferchichi & Paturel, 
2013; Williams, 2001). The literature provides ample 
evidence on the positive association between ICD and 
firm value (see for example, Orens et al., (2009); 
Mansour, Somaia & Soad, (2014); Iranmahd et al., 
(2014); Ferchichi & Paturel (2013); Dashti et al., 
(2016)). 
Unfortunately, most firms do not provide mea-
ningful information about their intellectual capital, 
which therefore lead to information asymmetry 
(Gamerschlag, 2013). Furthermore, a firm‟s poor 
intellectual capital implies that there is a need for 
shareholders to acquire new financing or divert cash 
flows form current investments or debt repayment 
(Williams, 2001). In this light, ICD hence reduces the 
information asymmetry (IA), defined as the situation 
in which one party has more information (usually the 
firms) over the other party (usually the stakeholders) 
(Dadbeh, Abednazari & Mogharebi, 2013), or when 
there is an equality of information (Shiri & Ebrahimi, 
2012) between the management and shareholders of 
organization due to separation of ownership (Brown 
& Ryngaert, 1991). Previous studies (e.g., Anifowose 
et al., 2016); Cormier et al., 2009) have documented 
that ICD has a significant negative impact on IA.  
When investors have limited access to the 
information (i.e., high IA), they would consider the 
benefits and costs to acquire more information about a 
given firm to support their investment decisions. 
Investors who found that the cost of collecting more 
data outweighs its benefits may seek and collect more 
information from alternative sources (Ferreira, Branco 
& Moreira, 2012). The information “attached” in ICD 
signals investors and creditors about the firm‟s future 
wealth creation capabilities, thereby reducing the 
perceived risks associated with the firm. Conse-
quently, their requirements on the invested funds are 
minimal therefore causing a decline in the firm‟s cost 
of capital (COC) (Williams, 2001). It follows then 
that high ICD reduces both IA and COC, and that IA 
increases proportionately with COC. 
Information asymmetry that arises between 
firms and investors would influence many decisions 
made in the business (Myers, 1977). In this state, 
managers tend to have a better and realistic prediction 
about the organizations as a whole but it does not 
apply to investors (Fosu, Danso, Ahmad & Coffie, 
2016). Investors who are not well-informed about the 
activities of a firm cannot produce a thorough assess-
ment of its future wealth creation capabilities (Li, Pike 
& Haniffa, 2007). This leads to an undervaluation of 
the firm by the market (Fosu et al., 2016) because 
investors are unable to make a more precise valuation 
of its worth (Li et al., 2007). Past studies (e.g., Fosu et 
al., 2016); Dadbeh et al., 2013); Shiri & Ebrahimi, 
2012) inform our understanding that information 
asymmetry has a negative significant impact on the 
firm value. This means that, when lower information 
asymmetry exists, it is more likely that the firm value 
will increase, and vice versa.  
An organization‟s investment is considered 
valuable only when the predictable capital return is 
higher than the capital cost. The logic behind this was 
because an organization should earn maximum profits 
to satisfy its shareholders, leading to the increase of 
firm value The appropriate level of cost of capital has 
been one of the most critical issues many financial 
experts strive to identify (Sattar, 2015; Mohamad & 
Saad, 2012). Effective capital budgeting would be an 
essential element of business strategy to generate 
shareholder value and therefore enhance profitability 
and firm value at the same time (Sattar, 2015). Seve-
ral scholars (e.g., Sattar, 2015; Sumaryati & Tris-
tiarini, 2017; Mohamad & Saad, 2012) found the 
effect of weighted average cost of capital (WACC) to 
be significantly negative on the firm value. It has a 
meaning that when the organizations‟ cost of capital is 
decline, the firm value will increase.  
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The aforementioned literature on the relation-
ships among ICD, IA, COC, and FV has led to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: Intellectual capital disclosure positively influ-
ence firm value. 
H2: Intellectual capital disclosure negatively influ-
ence information asymmetry. 
H3: Information asymmetry negatively influence 
firm value. 
H4: Intellectual capital disclosure negatively influ-
ence cost of capital. 
H5: Cost of capital negatively influence firm value. 
H6: Information asymmetry positively influence cost 
of capital. 
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1 Population and Sample  
The manufactur sector is chosen for the research 
context, which provided an opportunity to investigate 
the effects of intellectual capital disclosure, infor-
mation asymmetry, and cost of capital on firm value. 
The sample frame consisted of three sub-sector of 
manufactur, namely namely basic industry and che-
micals sectors, miscellaneous industry sectors, and 
consumer goods sectors listed on the Indonesian stock 
exchange. Samples are selected purposively, the tech-
nique in which included in the non-probability 
method of sampling. The criteria with which these 
samples are selected are as follows: 
 Companies from basic industry and chemicals 
sector, miscellaneous industry sector, and consu-
mer goods sector listed in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
 The initial public offering (IPO) dated before 
2012. 
 The currency expressed in financial statements 
must be in Indonesia Rupiah.  
 Complete financial statement and annual report 
during years 2012-2016.  
 
Based on 154 companies as the population, only 
67 companies of which met the purposive sampling 
criteria. This study uses secondary data (which is 
obtained from anual report and Bloomberg) related to 
the variables or constructs under examination. The 
data were analyzed through the partial least square 
(PLS) method. The analysis followed the two-step 
approach recommended by Gerbing and Anderson 
(1988) in which both the measurement and structural 
fit of the model were verified, respectively. The mea-
surement portion of the model was analyzed through 
convergent and discriminant validity to establish 
measurement fit with the data (Hair, Hult, Ringle & 
Sarstedt, 2014). On the other hand, the structural fit of 
the model was confirmed through path analysis 
involving a bootstrap procedure to test the hypotheses 
for this research. Several results on the model‟s pre-
dictive accuracy (i.e., through coefficient of determi-
nation R
2
) and relevance (i.e., through blindfolding 
Q
2
) were also reported. 
 
3.2 Variable Measurement 
3.2.1 Intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) 
The analysis of intellectual capital disclosure 
employees equal-weighted index, in which a scoring 
system that assigns a point of each intellectual capital 
information sub-category pertaining to any of three 
categories being considered (Ferreira et al., 2012). 
The calculation of intellectual capital disclosure index 
is as follow (Yan, 2017):  
ICDI 
  
 
        
Where:  
ICDI = Intellectual capital disclosure index 
D = Scored 1 if disclosed; 0 if otherwise  
N = Number of total categories in intellectual capital 
disclosure checklist 
 
3.2.2 Information Asymmetry (IA) 
Well-informed stakeholders who have better 
access to the information are more capable in 
affecting the supply and demand of the share‟s price 
leading to the so-called spread in bid-ask spread 
(Salehi et al., 2014). To calculate bid-ask spread is as 
follows (Lu & Chueh, 2015): 
Bid-Ask Spread = { 
     
(     )  
}     
Where: 
Spread = bid-ask spread 
AP = ask price  
BP = bid price 
N = number of trading days during a year 
 
3.2.3 Cost of capital (COC) 
According to Mohamad and Saad (2012), the 
overall cost of capital is also knows as the weighted 
average cost of capital or WACC where it has been 
widely used to predict and assess the cost of capital of 
an organization. Normally, to the cost of debt must be 
adjusted to reflect the tax deductibility of interest 
expenses. To calculate the weighted average cost of 
capital is as follows  (Modigliani & Miller, 1958): 
     [
 
 
   (    )       ]   
 
 
        
Where: 
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D  = the market value of debt (number of bond 
outstanding x current market price of the 
bond) 
E  = is the market value of equity (number of 
shares outstanding x current market price of 
one share) 
V  =  the market value of the firm (market value of 
debt + market value of equity) 
Tc  =  corporate tax rate 
CoD =  cost of debt 
CoE  =  cost of equity 
 
3.2.4 Firm value (FV) 
To calculate the firm value, Tobin‟s Q measure-
ment was used. Tobin‟s Q computed as the book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity 
added with the market value of equity in the 
numerator and the book value of total assets in the 
denominator (Orens et al., 2009). The calculation of 
Tobin‟s Q (Cormier et al., 2009; Ferchichi & Paturel, 
2013; Dadbeh et al., 2013; Al-Matari, Al-Swidi & 
Fadzil, 2014; Shiri & Ebrahimi, 2012) is as follow: 
 
         
        
  
 
Where:  
MVE  = Market Value Equity (stock prices x out-
standing shares) 
Debt   =  The book value of debt 
TA =  Total assets 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Evidence of Measurement Fit  
The measurement model comprises of four 
single-item constructs, which was evaluated on the 
basis of their internal consistency reliability, con-
vergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 
2014). The data were all ratio measures of each 
construct, whose validity and reliability were summa-
rized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Results Summary for Measurement Model 
Indicators Loadings Composite Reliability AVE 
Bid-Ask Spread 1 1 1 
ICDI 1 1 1 
Tobins Q 1 1 1 
WACC 1 1 1 
Note. AVE = Average Variance Extracted 
 
Since all constructs are unidimensional, the 
results of measurement model evaluation through 
SmartPLS 3.2.7 returned a perfect constructs‟ 
variance explained by their measures (i.e., the value of 
1). Similarly, the composite reliability values of all the 
single-item constructs are 1, but cannot be largely 
interpreted that they signal perfect reliabilities (see 
Hair et al., 2014, p. 110). Results from the PLS 
algorithm also showed values of 1 for each con-
structs‟ square-root of AVE, which were well above a 
given construct‟s correlation with any other construct 
in the model thus establish discriminant validity 
between constructs (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Fornell-Larcker Criterion for Assessing Discri-
minant Validity 
 COC FV IA ICD 
COC Single-item 
construct 
   
FV -0.146 Single-item 
construct 
  
IA 0.124 -0.310 Single-item 
construct 
 
ICD -0.110 0.443 -0.390 Single-item 
construct 
 
4.2 Evidence of Structural Fit  
The assessment of the structural model largely 
builds around the results of bootstrapping and blind-
folding procedures. An assessment of collinearity 
presence in the model was first examined. Table 3 
shows that all variance inflation factor (VIF) below 
the cutoff point of 5 (Hair et al., 2014), thereby 
concluding that there is no issue of collinearity among 
the predictor constructs in the structural model.  
 
Table 3. Collinearity Assessment 
 
COC FV IA ICD 
COC 
 
1.020 
  
FV 
    
IA 1.179 1.188 
  
ICD 1.179 1.184 1.000 
 
 
The structural model (results summarized in 
Table 4, PLS model shown in Figure 1) exhibits the 
R2 values of COC (0.02), FV (0.226), and IA (0.152), 
which show that the effect of ICD on COC, IA, and 
FV can be considered as weak to moderate. The 
structural model also exhibits good predictive rele-
vance, as shown by the values of Q2 that are well 
above the zero cutoff point.  
The path coefficient values inform our 
understanding that ICD is the strongest 
determinant FV, followed by IA. Also in the 
model we can see that IA is the primary driver of 
COC, and that ICD strongly determines IA. In 
the relationships among constructs we learn that 
all relationships in the structural model are 
significant except for ICD  COC, with the 
acceptable significance level at ten percent error 
probability for COC  FV.  
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4.3 Additional Assessment: Mediation Effect  
Results from the bootstrapping procedure 
showed specific and joint-mediation effects of 
two key mediators IA and COC in the relation-
ship between ICD and FV. Table 5 shows that 
only IA that can significantly explain the effect 
of ICD on FV (t = 3.568, p = 0.000). We also 
learn that in the relationship between ICD and 
COC, IA can only explain the effect of ICD on 
COC at the 90 percent confidence level. Results 
from joint-mediation analysis additionaly show-
ed that IA and COC cannot jointly mediate the 
effect of ICD on FV.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
The effect of ICD on FV was substatantiated, 
which means that as organizations disclose more of its 
intellectual capital information, the firm value would 
therefore increase. This is in line with the research of 
 
Figure 1. PLS Structural Model 
 
Table 4. Results Summary for Structural Model 
Construct 
Model Prediction   
Accuracy Relevance   
COC 0.020 0.004   
FV 0.226 0.210   
IA 0.152 0.143   
 Significance Test Results 
 Path Coefficient t Value p Value Hypothesis 
ICD  FV 0.374 6.914*** 0.000 H1 substantiated 
ICD  IA -0.390 10.152*** 0.000 H2 substantiated 
IA  FV -0.153 3.586*** 0.000 H3 substantiated 
ICD  COC -0.072 1.330 0.185 H4 rejected 
COC  FV -0.086 1.766* 0.078 H5 partially substantiated 
IA  COC 0.096 1.973** 0.049 H6 substantiated 
Note. The t and p values were obtained through bootstrapping procedure (individual sign change, and two-sided test at 95% 
confidence interval). The measures of cross-validated redundancy of Q2 were obtained from the blindfolding procedure with 
the omission distance of 7. 
*p < .10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001 (two-sided test). 
 
Table 5. Mediation Assessment 
 Indirect effects Direct effects Total effects 
Path coefficient t Value Path coefficient t Value Path coefficient t Value 
ICD -> IA -> COC -0.037 1.778 -0.072 1.330 -0.110 1.861 
ICD -> IA -> COC -> FV 0.003 1.118 0.374 6.914 0.443 9.228 
ICD -> COC -> FV 0.006 0.786 0.374 6.914 0.443 9.228 
ICD -> IA -> FV 0.060 3.568*** 0.374 6.914 0.443 9.228 
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Orens et al., (2009); Mansour et al., (2014); Ferchichi 
and Paturel (2013); Dashti et al., (2016); Alfraih et al., 
(2017); Sudibyo and Basuki (2017); Subaida, 
Nurkholis and Mardiati (2017). As signaling theory 
proposes that voluntary disclosure such as intellectual 
capital information allow investors and other relavant 
staekholders to produce a better assessment about the 
organization‟s values and their ability to generate 
future wealth. By disclosing intellectual capital infor-
mation tend to improve transparency, legitimize status 
and enhance reputation (Oliveira et al., 2006). The 
transparency would therefore lead to the increase of 
firm value since it appeals market to have a better 
image of an organization through the intellectual 
capital information released (Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000). 
The effect of ICD on IA was substantiated, im-
plying that the higher intellectual capital information 
disclosed by organization would lead to the lower 
information asymmetry. This is in line with the 
research of Anifowose et al., (2016); Cormier et al., 
(2009); Nucholisah and Yadiati (2017); Orens et al., 
(2009). The reduction of information asymmetry 
could be lowered only when the organizations com-
mit to disclose the highest level of the information 
organizations have access to (Verrechia, 2001). 
Voluntary intellectual capital disclosures tend to 
reduce information asymmetry between organizations 
and those external users of the information (Bruggen, 
Vergauwen & Dao, 2009). 
The effect of IA on FV was substantiated there-
fore we can conclude that as information asymmetry 
decreases, the firm value increases. This is in line with 
the research of Fosu et al., (2016). Investors who are 
not well-informed about the activities of organizations 
cannot produce a thorough assessment of the orga-
nizations‟ future wealth creation capabilities (Li et al., 
2007). Investors do not have the whole „true‟ image 
about the organizations, a tendency causing their 
equity to be undervalued by the market (Fosu et al., 
2016). Consequently, investors cannot afford to make 
a more precise valuation of the firm (Li et al., 2007). 
Consequently, decreasing information asymmetry 
between the management as the insiders and the 
investors as the outsiders will in turn “enrich” the 
market price disclosed by organizations (Rieg & 
Vanini, 2015).  
The effect of ICD on COC was rejected. Statis-
tically, ICD have no impact on COC, however the 
sign of the relationship is negative. This is in line with 
the research of Sasongko, Admadianto, Trisnawati 
and Wiyadi (2016); Setiawati and Agustina (2016). 
Firms who attempt to make public the information of 
intellectual capital will not effect the amount of cost 
of capital bearing by the firms. The reason was due to 
information such as intellectual capital is not con-
siderably relevant and sufficient enough to Indonesian 
investors‟ eyes (Sasongko et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
stakeholders normally would require organizations to 
disclose information related to the business, therefore 
helping them in making decision. This hence requires 
that the main reason for which organizations prepare 
annual reports is to provide the information to satisfy 
the requirements by various stakeholders (Mouritsen, 
Larsden & Bukh, 2001). However, not all the requ-
ired information to make informed decision is 
included in the annual report (Sasongko et al., 2016), 
thereby making it difficult for investors to produce a 
thorough assessment thereof. 
The effect of COC on FV was substantiated, 
which measn that the lower the cost of capital, the 
higher the firm value. This is in line with the research 
of Sattar (2015). Effective and accurate financing 
decision making lead to the maximization of share-
holders‟ value through maximizing the firm value 
(Mohamad & Saad, 2012; Agarwal, Taffler, Bellotti 
& Nash, 2015). Therefore, the financial experts are 
trying their best to identify and obtain the optimal 
capital structure to the point where the cost of capital 
(WACC) are minimized therefore increasing the firm 
value (Brigham & Gapenski, 1996; Agarwal et al., 
2015; Singhal, 2014). 
The effect of IA on COC was substantiated, 
which is in line with the research of Liu and Niu 
(2012); Nurjanati and Rodoni (2015); Murni (2004); 
Sasongko et al., (2016); He, Lepone & Leung (2013); 
Amstrong, Core, Taylor and Verrecchia (2011). As 
there is unbalanced information (i.e., information 
asymmetry arises), investors have a doubt regarding 
the firm‟s performance in which leading to the 
unattractiveness (reducing its liquidity) of firm‟s 
shares resulting in the the small trading volume 
(Sasongko et al., 2016). In other words, when high 
information asymmetry exists, investors would de-
mand a high cost of capital for the added transaction 
costs (Botosan, 1997) as well ass estimation of risks 
(Shiri & Ebrahimi, 2012). They believe that the 
reduction in information asymmetry would reduce an 
organization‟s cost of capital (Bruggen et al., 2009; 
Botosan, 1997). According to economic theory, infor-
mation asymmetry leads to an increase in organi-
zations cost of capital because it leads to adverse 
selection between buyers and sellers (Alfraih, 2017), 
which tends to reduce the liquidity of an organi-
zation‟s securities (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985). 
IA was found be to meadiating the effect of ICD 
on FV. The signaling element such as intellectual 
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capital disclosure could mount up organizations‟ 
values by enhancing their image, creating and im-
proving an understanding of organization‟s perfor-
mance, thereby magnetizing potential investors 
through reduced information asymmetry (Singh & 
Mitchell, 2008; Rodgers, 2007; Vergauwen & Alem, 
2005).  
 
6. Conclusion 
This research examines the direct effect of ICD 
on FV and the indirect effect through which IA and 
COC act as key mediating processes. The research 
context is Indonesian manufacturers listed on Indo-
nesian Stock Exchange with the data period of 2012-
2016. The finding supports hyphotesis H1, H2, H3, 
H5 and H6 respectively: ICD has significant, positive 
effect on FV; ICD has significant, negative effect on 
IA; IA has significant negative effect on FV; COC 
has significant negative effect on FV; IA has signi-
ficant positive effect on COC. However, the effect of 
ICD on COC is found statistically not significant but 
has the negative sign. As for the indirect effect, only 
IA found mediating the effect of ICD on FV.  
Based on the result drawn up from the research, 
there are some managerial implications that could be 
a use for companies and related stakeholders specially 
in today‟s era of knowledge-based economy. Mana-
gement of the company should pay more concerned 
on disclosing voluntary information such as intellec-
tual capital information, as ICD is value relevant to 
the investors, in which such information have an 
effect on the activities in capital market and  to to 
boost and obtain more of investors‟s confidence in 
decision making of their investment therefore influ-
ence investor‟s investment decision. This reserach 
highlight the importance of supllying additional non-
financial information with intellectual capital infor-
mation since it plays a significant role in affecting the 
market valuation of the organiztaion. Such disclosure 
would also reduce inbalance information between 
more informed and less informed stakeholders.  
The limitation of this research deals only with 
the quantity of intellectual capital information dis-
closed. An interesting avenue is for future research to 
investigate both the quality and quantity of the dis-
closure of intellectual capital information. Besides, the 
sample of this research is chosen purposively and it is 
only manufacturing firms in Indonesia. Future 
research could investigate the impact of intellectual 
capital disclosure with the samples of companies 
specifically classified into high-intensive and low-
intensive intellectual capital firms.  
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